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Algorithmic Silence: A Call to Decomputerize
Jonnie Penn*
Abstract: Tech critics become technocrats when they overlook the daunting administrative density of a
digital-first society. The author implores critics to reject structural dependencies on digital tools rather than
naturalize their integration through critique and reform. At stake is the degree to which citizens must defer to
unelected experts to navigate such density. Democracy dies in the darkness of sysadmin. The argument and a
candidate solution proceed as follows. Since entropy is intrinsic to all physical systems, including digital
systems, perfect automation is a fiction. Concealing this fiction, however, are five historical forces usually
treated in isolation: ghost work, technical debt, intellectual debt, the labor of algorithmic critique, and various
types of participatory labor. The author connects these topics to emphasize the systemic impositions of digital
decision tools, which compound entangled genealogies of oppression and temporal attrition. In search of a
harmonious balance between the use of “AI” tools and the non-digital decision systems they are meant to
supplant, the author draws inspiration from an unexpected source: musical notation. Just as musical notes
require silence to be operative, the author positions algorithmic silence—the deliberate exclusion of highly
abstract digital decision systems from human decision-making environments—as a strategic corrective to the
fiction of total automation. Facial recognition bans and the Right to Disconnect are recent examples of
algorithmic silence as an active trend.
Key words: technocracy; algorithmic silence; history; labor; artificial intelligence; AI ethics; automation;
decomputerization

1

Introduction

In 1948, in an article in Business Week, a Vice President
at the Ford Motor Company coined the term
“automation” to promote the use of mechanized
self-governance in manufacturing. Since entropy, error,
and deterioration are intrinsic to all physical systems,
including digital systems, perfect automation is a fiction.
Even still, economists, industrialists, and technologists
continue to invoke idealizations of “automation” in their
influential visions of society. In this article, the author
challenges the heightened rhetoric major technology
companies and computer scientists have recently used to
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characterise the autonomous and predictive capabilities
of advanced digital decision tools, the current vogue of
the automated society. The author shows how reports of
a looming “AI Revolution” misrepresent the complex
ways in which such tools have been used, in practice, to
preserve the political status quo in the United States and
United Kingdom.① Yet this article is not just a critique.
In pursuit of a harmonious balance between the use of
such tools, the use of the non-digital decision systems
they are meant to supplant, and the modes of
administrative labor required for each, the author draws
inspiration from an unexpected source: musical notation.
Just as musical notes require silence in order to be
operative, the author argues that societies must
strategically emphasize—rather than simply seeking to
displace—non-digital decision systems by limiting their
use of digital alternatives. To crystallize this point, the
author introduces the concept of algorithmic silence: the
①The author reserves his comments to the two countries about which
he has most expertise.
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designation of a deliberate exclusion of highly abstract
digital decision systems from human decision-making
environments. Recent bans on facial recognition
technologies are an example of algorithmic silence.
While the rise of digital automation has afforded
tremendous opportunities for social transformation, it
has also disguised growing administrative burdens. This
underappreciated coupling is, by my account, a key
reason to normalize algorithmic silence. As the cost of
digital decision systems decreases globally and their use
becomes more prolific, the accompanying need for
diverse types of administrative labor will escalate,
perhaps precipitously. To evidence this trend, the author
connects five realms of scholarship usually treated in
isolation: ghost work, technical debt, intellectual debt,
the labor of algorithmic critique, and various types of
participatory labor. The author emphasizes the systemic
impositions that digital decision systems make on
human beings not only as workers and members of
different racial, class, or gender groups, as other scholars
have shown, but also as consumers, citizens, parents, or
any other number of identity frames. These obligations
compound in idiosyncratic proportions depending on
one’s entangled identities, and their harms should be
mitigated in respect to these differences. Yet, the author
adds, the potential also exists to forge a cross-cutting
form of solidarity that addresses broad exposures to the
Kafkaesque cacophony of digital decision systems in
oversupply. Modes of collective restraint, such acts of
algorithmic silence, could help distance AI development
from technocracy and align it with traditions of
de-escalation, such as decomputerization and degrowth.

2

Disingenuous Rhetoric and “The AI
Revolution”

In popular use today, the term “artificial intelligence” is
a palimpsest: etched over the disciplines’ mid-twentieth
century origins, rife with theories of neural activity, is a
radical ethos of imminent social transformation via
automation.② AI is a catch-all not just for a branch of
computer science and its subsets, but for myriad other
digital automation techniques as well. Yarden Katz
excavates this layering to reveal how, in the early 2010s,
major American technology firms lent panache to
sales of their data science and machine learning
②A palimpsest is a manuscript on which later writing has been
superimposed on earlier writing. Thank you to Sarah Dillon for this
metaphor.
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products and services by perpetuating the existence of
“The AI Revolution”[1]. Their campaigns publicly
consummated[2] the field’s longstanding but
underappreciated entanglements with institutional
patrons intent on developing sophisticated tools for
social analysis and control[3]. These interventions
capitalized on tropes of imminent technological
potential inherited through Western myth, science
fiction, religion, economics, and popular culture[4–9].
Blade Runner, for example, which builds its narrative
around the existence of synthetic human-like “replicants”,
is set on November 20, 2019, the rough date of this
article’s writing[10]. The future, it seems, is now.
The AI Revolution, like the computer revolution, is
not a real revolution[11, 12].③ Proponents do not seek to
forcibly overthrow an existing social order. Far from it.
As Katz shows, the AI Revolution is largely a
conservative push to preserve and benefit from the
political status quo, which, as this issue attests, is marked
by historic levels of financial and informational
inequality. A growing body of scholarship clarifies how
such tool and services repackage and reinforce
anti-black[13, 14],
anti-poor[15],
and
chauvinist
[16]
logics —all under the pretense of progress and
efficiency[11, 17–21]. The AI Revolution is thus genuinely
political—just not in the ways it is made out to be[22].
Disingenuous rhetoric plays an important role in
constructing civic imaginaries about the future. A
critical audit of the evocative terminology used in and
around AI research is long overdue[23–25]. A 1976
missive by an MIT AI engineer challenged the field’s
“contagious” use of wishful mnemonics: words that
served as “incantations” for a desired result, rather than
sober descriptions of a mechanism or function[23, 26–29].④
A recent framing captures this trick in action. In 2018,
a team at the Toronto Rotman School of Management
cast AI as “a drop in the cost of prediction”[30]. As
prediction became cheaper, the team reasoned, it would
be used to solve problems that were not traditionally
prediction problems, such as autonomous driving. This
③See Hicks for a critical take on how the 1950−1970s computer
“revolution” in the UK served to entrench existing gender inequalities.
Summary in Ref. [12].
④Naming conventions were judged to have warped researcher’s
relationship to the epistemic significance of their designs. Artificial
intelligence is itself a wishful mnemonic, unique from chemistry and
physics in that the name portrays an intention. See Garvey for a survey of
AI critique over the second half of the twentieth century and Dreyfus for
a glimpse into various eras of critique.
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is an insightful observation, but not necessarily for the
reasons its authors intended. The AI Revolution does not
mark a genuine drop in the cost of prediction, but it may,
instead, mark a meaningful drop in the cost to feign
prediction. Stated differently, it is becoming trivially
easy to manufacture the pretense of “predicting” an
outcome in areas where prediction, in fact, defies natural
law.
Critics clarify that, at a technical level, contemporary
AI capabilities are closer in substance to Katz’s account
than to the account put forward by those at the Rotman
School[24，31]. Most so-called “predictive” analytics lack
the necessary relation to causality to genuinely foretell
an outcome in advance. “I have not found a single paper
predicting a future result. All of them claim that a
prediction could have been made; i.e., they are post-hoc
analysis”[31]. The term is mistakenly used to describe
novel statistical correlations after events have occurred,
rather than identifying a determinate causal mechanism
beforehand. One example is the recently debunked claim
that AI can “predict” someone’s sexual preference from
their photograph[32]. Prediction implies prophecy, which
is intimidating and inaccurate. At a technical level,
argues Momin M. Malik, the term “detect” is more
precise, if still not totally satisfying.⑤
The risks involved in indulging such prophetic
rhetoric are compounded in cases in which a user’s
environment can be altered to make a product appear
more “predictive” than it is[33–35]. For instance, it is far
easier for a driverless vehicle to appear autonomous
within the perpetually dry city grid of Phoenix, Arizona,
than it would be for that same vehicle to navigate the wet,
twisted lanes of Aberdeen, Scotland. Phoenix has fewer
characteristic features, which makes changes easier for
an “autonomous” vehicle to infer. Disingenuous rhetoric
arises when results from a constrained environment (e.g.,
Phoenix) are treated as universally applicable (e.g.,
adequate to navigate all locales, including Aberdeen).
These claims are covertly subjective not just because
they overstate the competency of the algorithmic system
in question under the guise of technological objectivity,
but also because they treat the value of certain
constraints (e.g., a city in a grid formation) as
self-evident, as if worthy of mass reproduction along
with the new autonomous technology. “Prediction”
⑤Personal correspondence. Thank you to Momin for these critical
readings.
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rhetoric fuses a model with the environment it is most
successful in, incentivizing the recreation of those
constrained environments to accompany propagation of
those models[36]. This conservative push for the
hegemonic standardization of human environments and
behaviors is especially pernicious when deployed in
value sensitive domains like healthcare.⑥
These dynamics are not new. The profundity of
automatic manufacturing has long been a matter of
training audiences’ perspective to notice certain
contributing features at the expense of others. In the
nineteenth century London, recounts Stephanie Dick,
Karl Marx criticized Charles Babbage for
anthropomorphising
cogs
and
gears
while
simultaneously failing to recognize the humanity of his
own craftsmen[38，39]. When the term “automation” was
coined in 1948 by a Vice President at the Ford Motor
Company, economists, industrialists, and unionists
seized the term—under inconsistent definitions—to
articulate their own competing visions of society[40]. In
present day, Astra Taylor coins the term “fauxtomation”
to provide a more accurate characterization of the
concealed chains of labor that sustain contemporary
modes of digital automation[41]. The notion of
“autonomy” is a fiction concealed through the chronic
underreporting and/or dehumanization of living
contributors, argues Taylor. It is a horizon sought for but
never reached, like an asymptote stretching hopelessly
toward zero.
Having briefly considered how various rhetorical
maneuvres distort civic imaginaries of automation both
past and present, it is appropriate to ask what is, in fact,
required to sustain pursuit of the endless horizon that is
ubiquitous digital automation. In the section that follows,
the author connects five labor trends usually treated in
isolation: ghost work, technical debt, intellectual debt,
the labor of algorithmic critique, and various types of
participatory labor. The author’s aim in connecting
these threads is to emphasize the systematic nature in
which different modes of digital automation extract and
appropriate human labor simultaneously. The shadowy
politics active in these systems are perhaps best
recognized in cases of piecemeal low-pay tasks, as in the
category of ghost work. Here, industrial actors
⑥Rhetoric of this type has already been found to obscure the flawed
scientific foundations of such tools[37] and to legitimize pseudoscience in
areas like criminal justice, human resources, credit scoring and in
medicine.
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dehumanize contingent workers to rationalize indecent
conditions and maximize profits. Yet ghost work, on its
own, is not fully illustrative of the broad spectrum of
underappreciated impositions that digital automation
makes upon human labor. The author explores four
additional categories. As the author will show, technical
debt and intellectual debt normalize poor craftsmanship
and pseudoscience in the development of digital
products and services, thereby offsetting an unspecified
burden of maintenance and repair labor onto future
generations. In a similar vein, the labor of critique and
various modes of participatory labor help to sustain the
acceptability and reliability of these products and
services today. One wonders, in view of these labor
trends: if software eats the world… who will digest it?

3
3.1

Performing “The AI Revolution” — A
Taxonomy of Contingent Labor
Ghost work

The first category of labor to explore is ghost work, a
phenomenon that reveals the banality of the AI
Revolution in practice. Gray and Suri coined the term in
2019 to illuminate the opaque world of digital ondemand task fulfillment, in which online platforms
aggregate piecemeal low-pay tasks and repackage them
as the outputs of automation[42]. Examples of ghost work
include rideshare driving and the search and
categorization of micro tasks online. These platform
systems emerged from decades of corporate led
casualization and outsourcing, which normalized
precarious modes of employment[43]. Their existence is
critical to AI. For example, Fei-Fei Li’s AI team at
Stanford University estimated in 2007 that it would take
nineteen years of undergraduate labor to create
ImageNet, a large, gold-standard database of accurately
labeled images. Using ghost work, the team accessed
49000 human contributors from 167 countries to
produce the database in two and a half years[42].
ImageNet has been celebrated as a benchmark for
computer vision algorithms; one that fueled a surge of
media attention around AI techniques. Ghost workers, in
contrast, remain “the AI revolution’s unsung heroes”[42].
As the title suggests, ghost work is predicated on a
status of tortured impermanence. Workers are hired as
independent contractors rather than employees. This
makes precise figures on the scale and nature of the

phenomenon difficult to source. In 2017, the platform
economy employed an estimated 70 million workers
globally, with estimates for 2025 as high as 540 million
(as cited in Ref. [44]). In the post-industrial economies
of the US and UK, statistics indicate that ghost work is
large and growing[42].⑦ Recent news around the poor
performance of Facebook, Inc.’s platform content
moderation algorithms provides a glimpse into how
ghost work intersects with a well-funded and large-scale
AI project. In this domain, content moderators are
contracted to sort inappropriate content, often in
conjunction with algorithmic systems. In 2009,
Facebook was cited as paying twelve content moderators
for its one hundred and twenty million users[45]. By 2017,
this number allegedly grew to 4500 moderators. By 2019,
it reached between 15000−20000 moderators for
Facebook’s two and a quarter billion users[46–48].⑧
Between 2009−2019 then, Facebook’s content
moderator-to-user ratio grew approximately sixty times.
Ghost work is core to the AI Revolution. Facebook is
one of many corporations now intent on reconfiguring
their business around AI and, consequently, precarious
labor. In late 2017, YouTube LLC. declared it would hire
10000 content moderators for its 1.5−1.8 billion viewers,
more than double the number of its current 5000-person
employee base[49–51]. The most well-known ghost work
platform is Amazon.com, Inc.’s Mechanical Turk (or
MTurk) system, which provides businesses and
consumers with structured access to a marketplace of
low-cost and globally situated click workers. Between
2005−2016, MTurk grew five times, from
approximately 100000 to 500000[42]. Amazon touts
MTurk as “artificial artificial intelligence”. In
comparison, DefinedCrowd, one of many start-ups now
competing with MTurk, claims eighty employees and
211468 click workers, more than the 163800 people
working in oil and gas extraction across the United
States[52–54].⑨ Sector analysts claim that the marketplace
for third-party data labeling will grow six times by 2023
⑦In 2016, twenty million workers were estimated to earn money via
the completion of on-demand tasks in the United States. Estimates hold
that analogous modes of semi “automation” could reconfigure 38 percent
of US jobs by 2030. In developing countries, where much of ghost work
is based, there are not even these figures.
⑧In comparison, Facebook, Inc. reported 27705 employees in 2018.
⑨At time of writing, competing outlets include: Alegion, Appen, Cape
Start, Click Work, Cloud Factory, Cloud Sight, Data Pure, Defined
Crowd, Figure8, Cloud AutoML Vision, hCaptcha, Gengo, Gems, Hive,
iMerit, Labelbox, Lotus Quality Assurance, Micro Workers, MightyAI,
OC Lavi, Playment, Reef, Scale, Superb, and TaskUs.
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into a one billion dollar marketplace, with other
estimates reaching as high as five billion dollars[55–57].
The federal government in the United States has yet to
acknowledge or set labor protections for ghost workers,
whose fight for recognition has only recently
materialized into legislation in a handful of US states[58].
The job category “Content Moderator” remains
unrecognized by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; it is also
absent from the 21000 industry and 31000 occupational
titles measured by the US Census[59, 60]. This uneasy
status, along with the frequent lack of a shared worksite
or uniform job title, deepens workers’ precarity by
adding friction to collective action and the protections it
yields[42, 61].⑩
As in the era of Babbage, automation remains a matter
of perspective. Regulators maintain a stubborn faith in
narratives of imminent technological transformation.
Despite the troubling size and character of the ghost
work phenomenon, regulators fail to confront the
possibility of its persistence, and thus fail to accept it as
a site for reform. A 2015 World Bank report on online
outsourcing claimed that forecasting beyond 2020 was
“highly speculative” due to the sector’s susceptibility to
rapid technological change[62]. Gray and Suri challenge
this idleness. They revisit how Microsoft leveraged
Permatemp contracts as far back as the 1980s[42]. “We
can not be sure if the ‘last mile’ of the journey toward full
automation will ever be completed,” they warn, adding
that, “the great paradox of automation is that the desire
to eliminate human labor always generates new tasks for
humans”[42]. Even as technological boundaries change,
workers’ precarious status remains the same.
3.2

Technical debt

The second labor category to assess is technical debt.
Technical debt is a form of delayed labor normalized
through the acceptance of poor craftsmanship. In recent
years, the programming community has used the term to
characterize the compounding maintenance costs
associated with poor design choices in program writing.
Ward Cunningham coined the term in 1992, stating,
“Shipping first time code is like going into debt. A little
debt speeds development so long as it is paid back
promptly with a rewrite... The danger occurs when the
debt is not repaid. Every minute spent on not-quite-right
⑩Gray and Suri caution that no laws yet govern who counts as an
“employer” or “employee” in this domain. Roberts explains that content
moderators are also hired under the work titles “screener” or “community
manager”.
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code counts as interest on that debt.”[63] Attempts at a
framework for how to measure and monitor technical
debt remain theoretical at best[64–69]. Estimates hold that
in the development of machine learning systems,
technical debt accrues at a rate comparable to that of a
high-interest credit card[70, 71]. Researchers at Google,
Inc. warn of compounding “correction cascades” in
these fragile models, meaning hidden feedback loops,
signal entanglements, and other technical challenges due
to what they describe as the CACE principle, for
“Changing Anything Changes Everything”[70].
Tomorrow’s workers, both expert and not, will inherit
the labor required to constantly repair and maintain this
delicate infrastructure. That Facebook’s moderator-touser ratio increased sixty-fold between 2009−2019
speaks to the scope of the labor force required to
algorithmically oblige evolving norms, customs, and
laws in an ever-increasing number of overlapping
domains. The European Commission, by analogy,
employs a full-time “Protocol Service” to keep its human
leadership tuned to ever-shifting cultural and political
norms in national and regional contexts within that
boundary[72].⑪ As the CACE principle distills, it is
difficult to design AI systems that integrate a similarly
fluid and complex set of concerns in real-time without
human support. This difficulty rises further as
developers attempt to model three dimensional
environments. Sally Applin argues that software active
in an “autonomous” vehicle must, in principle,
seamlessly and unfailingly update across shifting
municipal, city, regional, state/province, national, and
international borders[73]. This software would also
presumably register and integrate all relevant changes to
the unfixed physical world (e.g., downed trees, new
construction, etc.). These are Sisyphean undertakings.
Narratives of an AI “revolution” belie the distribution of
labor that make these performances of autonomy
feasible at all.
3.3

Intellectual debt

As with technical debt, intellectual debt is a form of
delayed labor. Zittrain uses the term to characterize the
manner in which AI—and machine learning
specifically—serve to “increase our collective
intellectual credit line” by providing atomized solutions
to problems without any clear explanation of the causal
⑪ They are responsible to oversee appropriate gifts, actions, attire, and
even choice in songs for events.
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mechanisms involved[74]. In principle, access to this
credit line could normalize widespread offsetting of
theoretical explanation, where isolated decisions not to
identify causal mechanisms accrue into a network of
unchecked faith. Despite digital tools being the primary
cause of this phenomenon, they are also held up as a
primary solution, which fuels a feedback loop toward
trained dependency and the centralization of power
amidst cacophony. “A world of knowledge without
understanding becomes a world without discernible
cause and effect, in which we grow dependent on our
digital concierges to tell us what to do and when”[74].
Influential figures in the American technology sector
have extolled this horizon. In a 2008 article entitled “The
End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific
Method Obsolete”, Chris Anderson, chief editor of
Wired Magazine, called on his readers to reimagine
science in the mold of Google’s data-intensive
advertising business. He celebrated an explanatory
paradigm in which approximations to scientific truth
follow from correlations found in massive stores of
behavioral data, rather than from hypothesis and
testing[75]. Also in 2008, Peter Norvig, Google’s
research director, advocated to update the statisticians’
maxim “All models are wrong but some are useful”, to
“All models are wrong, and increasingly you can
succeed without them”[75].⑫ Weinberger, in a 2017
op-ed for Wired, reaffirmed Anderson’s vision for a new
decade, claiming, “Knowing the world may require
giving up on understanding it.”[76]
Intellectual debt is not unique to machine learning. As
Zittrain notes, it is routinely accepted in areas of
medicine. The drug Modafinil, for example, is sold with
a disclaimer stating that its reasons for being effective
are unknown. In the healthcare sector, however, such
decisions face significant regulatory scrutiny and
oversight. These burdens do not yet weigh as heavily on
the tech establishment. Nor is mistrust of intellectual
debt a guarantee that such heavy restrictions will
naturally emerge over time. In the 1980s, automated and
semi-automated document retrieval systems were met
with a similar mistrust[77]. Indeed, the embrace of
instrumentalist statistics in the United States can be
traced back to the late nineteenth century[78]. Without
regulatory oversights in place to ensure genuine social
progress, the merits of which have already been
⑫ The first maxim is commonly attributed to the statistician George Box.
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overlooked by existing AI principles[79], this trend will
likely burden tomorrow’s workers with the mountain of
tedious responsibilities that accompany navigating an
experimental turn away from the reliability of causation.
3.4

Critique

A fourth category of labor is critique. This category is
broad: it could feasibly encompass the labor required to
investigate, identify, articulate, remedy, and/or reject the
degenerative aspects of “autonomous” systems. This
characterization provides a wide enough berth to
encompass the work of theorists like, say, Langdon
Winner, activists like those in the Carceral Tech
Resistance Network, and those whose labor sustains
movements of technological prohibition like
Neo-Luddism. The ACM FAccT conference, which
highlights engineering critiques of algorithmic systems,
offers a window into the growth of at least one aspect of
this broad domain: since the conference was formed in
the late 2010s submissions have increased roughly two
times annually, from 73 in 2018 to 290 in 2020.⑬ While
the growth of the AI industry is now regularly indexed
by top universities and businesses[80], the growth of
so-called AI Ethics, a contentious title for the body of
criticism (as this issue conveys), is not as well
understood.
Of note is that, at present, much of this labor is
subsidized by the public. Of the seventy sets of
recommendations on trustworthy AI produced between
2017−2019, industry produced roughly a fifth of
submissions, and civil society and governments,
together, roughly a half[81, 82]. Principled proposals for
citizen juries and government-run data trusts extend, in
their orientation, a similar expectation for the public to
pay for the failures of automation. Zittrain, for instance,
positions academia, along with public libraries, as the
natural home for new modes of critique. He proposes that
datasets and algorithms that meet a sufficiently broad
level of public use could be tested by researchers to
mitigate errors and vulnerabilities before they
compound.
If adopted in tandem with structural reforms to labor
standards, such proposals could bear fruit. Regrettably,
most academic labor is now precarious and prone to
exploitation. 73 percent of faculty in American higher
education institutions work part-time or otherwise off
the tenure track, which provides little job security[83]. 60
⑬ ACM FAccT (formerly FAT*) stands for Association for Computing
Machinery’s Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency
in machine learning. Thank you to Christo Wilson for the figures.
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percent of higher education staff in UK universities
struggle to make ends meet, with part-time and hourly
paid teachers doing, on average, 45 percent of their work
without compensation[84]. Meanwhile, in early 2020,
Google, Inc.’s parent company Alphabet Inc. became the
fourth US technology company to reach a market cap of
over a trillion dollars, following Apple Inc., Amazon,
and the Microsoft Corporation, with Facebook now
close behind. The normalization of un- or low-paid
critique thus threatens to normalize public responsibility
for avoidable harms ill-managed by industry.
3.5

Participatory labor

The final category of labor the author assesses defies
reduction to a single classification. This cluster
encompasses the surfeit of unpaid and often
unrecognized tasks and offerings undertaken by
consumers, users, and citizens when they engage,
passively and actively, with digital modes of automation.
This includes but is not limited to:
• Do-it-yourself economies (e.g., self-checkouts,
self-check-ins, self-booking systems, solve-it-yourself
customer service);
• Open-source software economies (e.g., pro-bono
support of for-profit infrastructures);
• Inference economies (e.g., proprietary model
training via auto-complete, CAPTCHA or service
fulfillment, such as traffic patterns inferred from a
driver’s rideshare activity without fair compensation);
• Digital labor and informational labor economies
(e.g., online community management, such as the labor
volunteered by women of color in response to misogyny
and racism on platform systems[85–87]);
• Covert agency economies (e.g., the unacknowledged
workarounds users employ to modify or overcome
limited affordances in an algorithmic system[88]);
• Dark pattern economies (e.g., design affordances that
trick a user into signing up for something they do not
want[89]);
• Reputation maintenance economies (e.g., labor
undertaken to maintain one’s standing when it is
impacted by a system’s shortcomings or outright
failings[90]).
These diverse types of labor substantiate the “human
infrastructure” required to integrate digital automation
into daily life[91]. When deployed into structurally racist,
sexist, and ableist societies, such structures tend to
disproportionately penalize marginalized groups[92, 93].
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These burdens are normalized through appeals to a
neoliberal conception of consent, which assumes a base
level “capacity for consent” that is unsubstantiated in
reality[94]. When collective harms are framed as the
responsibility of each individual to navigate, only those
with power can afford to understand and overcome them.
Others face exile or deprivation when they try to resist.
Robust taxonomies and lines of solidarity are needed to
map, connect, reform, or reject these entangled forms of
labor, and to identify the toll of their collective
impositions. These taxonomies might also be used to
build toward renumeration and reparation structures that
recognize and respond to each party’s contingent
inputs[95, 96].
This brief survey of ghost work, technical debt,
intellectual debt, the labor of critique and participatory
labor highlights the significant labor—both in the
present and in the future—that organizations depend
upon to further the sales friendly mythos of AI. “We are
all system administrators now, whether we realize it or
not,” write Dick and Volmer, who assess user-supplied
maintenance in relation to Microsoft’s Windows
platform[97]. Much of what the author has covered here
reduces to the extended labor economies of error and
anomaly management. Given this common source, it is
worth noting that the earliest pioneers of computing had
not anticipated that such labor would be necessary. They
believed, wrongly, that computers would not have bugs.
In his autobiography, Maurice Wilkes, who developed
EDSAC, the first practical use stored-program digital
computer, grappled with the realization that a good
portion of the remainder of his life would be spent fixing
errors in his own code[98]. “Debugging had to be
discovered,” he recalled[98].⑭ In that era, and again with
AI’s maturation, the messy and irreducible complexities
of material reality interrupt the principled but all too
abstract aspirations of even the most accomplished
computing engineers.
Since the development of EDSAC in the 1940s, the
labor required to analyze, design, test, debug, and
develop computer programs has become a recognized
and deeply influential employment category known as,
“Software Development and Programming”. In the
United States, it is one of the few employment categories
to have emerged over the past century that employs a
significant proportion of the population. As of 2010,
⑭ Emphasis mine.
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there were thirty-five million computer experts
employed around the globe, five orders of magnitude
more than the initial group of scientists, engineers, and
support staff working in the midcentury[99]. In 2016,
1.7 million were employed as software developers in the
US alone, with an estimated 300000 expected to join in
the decade to come[100]. Low-cost fauxtomation
broadens this labor network even further, reaching into
exploitational labor categories that remain to be
taxonomized and acknowledged in the way that
Software Development and Programming was during
and after the 1960s.
Remaining to be seen, as responsibility for integrating
these errors translates slowly into a tree of discernible
job categories (e.g., content moderator, quality
assurance officer for driverless vehicles), is the extent to
which the accruing errors, harms, and sacrifices
involved in adopting these systems should be absorbed
by an already over-leveraged public. These impositions
are particularly difficult to characterize, as is their chain
of responsibility[101–103].⑮ By analogy, in 2016 analysts
positioned medical errors as the third leading cause of
death in the US[104, 105]. A 2018 report estimates that
software bugs killed more than one thousand patients per
year in the UK, with blame often passed on to doctors or
nurses[90, 106, 107].⑯ A decade prior to the AI Revolution,
the US Commerce Department estimated that computer
users shared half the cost of the ＄22.2−59.5 billion lost
annually as a result of inadequate software testing
infrastructure[108]. These sacrifices—lost lives, lost
wages, lost recognition, lost opportunity, lost insights,
and lost time—are substantial, and they will grow larger
still.

4

Automation’s Impositions: A Structural
View

The author’s reason for connecting these threads is to
⑮ Hobbyists, historians, and risk researchers maintain venues to
catalogue and characterize the impact of poor error management in digital
systems, but no sophisticated repository captures a broad picture of their
aggregate toll, both economic and otherwise. For a moderated forum on
the safety and security of computer and related systems see the Risk
Digest. For a hobbyist’s collection of serious or novel bugs see Huckle.
For recent research on the role of error in the history of computing, see
SIGCIS.
⑯ Elish calls this phenomenon of blame “the moral crumple zone” of
automated systems. “Just as the crumple zone in a car is designed to
absorb the force of impact in a crash, the human in a highly complex and
automated system may become simply a component—accidentally or
intentionally—that bears the brunt of the moral and legal responsibilities
when the overall system malfunctions.”
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draw attention to the outcomes of neglecting digital
automation’s systemic impositions, which entangle in
ways that resist simple reduction. Notions of labor
provide one lens into this change, as the prior sections
demonstrates. Yet labor, alone, is not the only way to
understand this change. As “predictive” technologies
swell and rescript the logic of daily behaviors in healthcare,
education, and beyond, competing automated systems
will vie for citizens’ finite time and encode their
behavior with sophisticated interactivity[109]. Without
adequate protections in place to monitor and/or
meaningfully prohibit such impositions, low-cost
decision systems will compound the public’s digital
obligations and slowly (or perhaps rapidly) sap their
availability to non-digital systems. Existing terms of
critique fail to capture the full character of this levy. Loss
is treated in financial terms, as technical debt or
intellectual debt, rather than a more profound loss of
possibility. Ruha Benjamin subverts this trend when
saying, in relation to technology’s role in perpetuating
anti-black logics, “Most people are forced to live inside
someone else’s imagination” (Ref. [110]; see also, in
relation to critique of normative conceptions of
time[111–113]).
An analogy is useful here as a means to characterize
the scale of this type of systemic phenomenon and the
related power that new vocabulary can have to
communicate the complex reasons for an equally broad
shift in course. The terms “global warming”, “climate
change”, and “Anthropocene” introduced the public to
the idea that local environmental harms, when taken in
aggregate, amounted to a fatal error in cultural logic, one
that now threatens the survival of our societies, with
marginalized groups around the globe faced with the
most dire risks[14]. These marquee terms speak to the
sum-total harm caused by a complex web of operators
whose default perspective was to treat carbon emissions
as an acceptable negative externality. Emissions
were considered someone else’s problem—just as
automation’s impositions are now. “Global warming”
and related terms interrupt that base assumption. They
illuminate the inescapable hazards for everyone that
accompany unrestrained material consumption.
That a climate crisis loomed in the late twentieth
century was clear to many long before the invention of
those aforementioned terms. In 1955, John Von
Neumann, whose logical architecture laid the blueprint
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for the digital era, opined about this inflection point in
an article entitled, “Can We Survive Technology?”[114].
During the first industrial revolution, he reasoned, “It
was possible to accommodate the major tensions created
by technological progress. Now this safety mechanism
is being sharply inhibited; literally and figuratively, we
are running out of room. At long last, we begin to feel the
effects of the finite, actual size of the earth in a critical
way.”[114] John Von Neumann reckoned with
technology’s aggregate material implications. In this
article, the author gestures to its aggregate temporal
implications and administrative obligations.
As with climate change, the localized impositions of,
in this case, low-cost decision systems, are dismissed by
society at large as uncontentious in the short-term. Only
once a ceiling asserts itself might this fleet of impositions
be seen as degenerative and systemic. Regrettably, as
with climate change, the existence of this ceiling is
difficult to convey to the broader public—until it is not.
Instead of fires, floods, and ecosystem collapse,
temporal erosion may come to resemble, say, a latent
denial-of-service (DoS) attack on a society’s daily
decision-making abilities. A DoS attack is a cyber-attack
in which a communication pathway is flooded with
enough superfluous requests to make it unavailable. By
analogy, a poverty of time, caused by the proliferation
of digital obligations and delights (deployed at low-cost),
could hobble the public’s collective capacity to consider
or even imagine alternative modes of social organization,
such as those that do not center on data, efficiency, or
technological progress. Wood writes, from a related
vantage, “Surely the most wretched unfreedom of all
would be to lose the ability even to conceive of what it
would be like to have the freedom we lack, and so
dismiss even the aspiration to freedom, as something
wicked and dangerous” (as cited in Ref. [92]).⑰
The difficultly of conveying this complex problem to
the public is that time attrition is the product of a
threatening system, not a threatening character or object.
The harms of automation in oversupply are captured
narratively in a folktale about The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,
in which an enchanted broom causes a flood by
collecting and pouring out too much water for its new,
inexperienced master. In the West, however, advanced
⑰ Although this may sound alarmist, the emergence of light and sound
pollution evidence how impacted parties can overlook what is lost amidst
poor regulation. The author once met a child who had never seen the stars
due to light pollution in his neighborhood.
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automation is often personified, through characters
like the Terminator, rather than being cast as
infrastructural or distributed. These accounts of
automation-as-individual, also captured in narratives
about job losses to robots, distort the public’s sensitivity
to both the banality of the AI Revolution and its
contingent harms. These stories convey a threat, but as
with climate change, they may underemphasize the
decentered nature of that threat.
Adding to the challenge of effective public
communication of a world awash with low-cost decision
systems is that skeuomorphs (i.e., features passed from
one technology to another related technology, like the
familiar “click” of a smartphone’s shutter, which does
not in fact exist or make a sound) have so far failed to
preserve traditional prohibitory functions, such as those
that ritualized natural limits and restraint. Digital
automation techniques know no opening hours, holiday
closures, snow days, sick days, periods of grievance, nor
even strict regulatory limits on their collective
impositions. These are the technological manifestations
of the neoliberal attitudes that preceded them.
Interventions in privacy law, labor law, consumer
protections, and in the digital wellbeing movement add
friction to select intrusions, as epitomized by worker’s
right to disconnect in France and Germany. Yet, as with
climate change, reform is still often cast in relation to the
individual, as if the potential to meter excess is somehow
unavailable at the group level. This is a false restriction.
Collective remedies, as always, remain viable.
The irony of this dilemma is that automation, at a
certain level of proliferation, eventually fails to fulfill on
its own celebrated purpose: to save time. The endless
need to integrate different types of automation draws the
ideal toward self-contradiction. Each new act of
coordination creates a new labor requirement. This labor
can be automated, but then that new automated system
must be integrated, too. This feedback loop introduces
new types of administrative obligations that, as the five
labor trends outlined above adequately suggests, can be
easily overlooked by those who benefit from their
presence. As with climate change, marginalized peoples
suffer these harms first. In the long run, however, as for
the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, a world awash with such
obligations would presumably ensnare their elite
creators as well by interweaving them in a society shaped
by the same scripted logics they have used to control
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others. The unrestrained use of low-cost decision
systems would amount to death by a thousand paper cuts
for a society callous to the compounding effects of such
temporal pollutants.
By my account, the prolific use of digital decision
systems, fueled by low marginal costs for proliferation
and ascendant narratives of an imminent AI Revolution,
marks a new stage in complex debates over the societal
role(s) of automation. The characteristic the author seeks
to denaturalize is the assumption that digital
automation—by its own logic—merits recognition as a
self-evident form of cultural progress. In the author’s
view, critics of automation who entertain this horizon
(e.g., automation-as-progress) without also embracing
acts of prohibition assume too readily that technical
solutions can be found—eventually—and that, as a
result, solutions should be labored toward. This endlesshorizon narrative permits systemic harms to persist, with
marginalized peoples bearing the brunt of tomorrow’s
maintenance. Acts of prohibition create decision making
systems in which knowledge of such tools is not a
prerequisite. With these spaces, critics endorse a
growing distance between them and the non-expert
communities they often aim to represent. Stated
differently, advanced automation techniques may need
to be resisted wholesale if tech ethics experts are to avoid
becoming the technocrats they seek to displace.

5

On Formalization and Its Alternatives

One way to resist the encroachment of digital automation
is to question the methodologies that clear a path for its
use. One such methodology is the use of formalization to
describe a system’s presumed nature. In his introduction
to Minsky’s 1961 paper, “Steps Toward Artificial
Intelligence”, which laid out a research agenda for that
discipline[115], guest-editor Harry T. Larson wrote,
“When the practitioner has overcome his fear of the
machine, and when the scientist and practitioner are
communicating, the attack is relentless. The scientific
mind has found an un-formalised field, and it cannot rest
until it identifies, understands, and organizes basic
elements of the field”[116]. Aspects of contemporary
research on fairness, accountability and transparency in
machine learning echo Larson’s positivist dogma by
implying that highly formalized engineering techniques
will muster adequate solutions, rather than re-inscribing
⑱ Jones uses “data positivism” to describe this instrumentalist model of
induction, which seeks functions that fit to the data, rather than functions
that fit to a corresponding law of nature.
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underlying
harms
or
reifying
ever
more
[78,
117]
⑱
bureaucratization
. Intervening at the point at
which attempts are made to formalize a social system
helps to provide citizens the derivative economic or
administrative relief needed to decide on a civic future
for themselves. Operating this far upstream avoids their
being automatically ensnared in debate over a decision
tool or technique that continues ad nauseam.
To conclude, the author fosters a metaphor that he
hopes will lend subtly to dialogue about how to reshape
positivist inclinations in the automation space into
something less brutal and domineering. In sheet music—
indeed, in music composition generally—special
notation is used to convey the role of a deliberative
silence. These constructions build negative space
purposefully, as a mode of art. Without rests, music
would be cacophony. A recent wave of legal prohibitions
on facial recognition technologies across American
cities substantiate deliberative restraint in response to
automation. US communities have opted to preserve
what the author calls an algorithmic silence: the
purposeful exclusion of highly abstract algorithmic
methods from human decision-making environments.
A silence of this type asserts that the value of such theory
is worth more to the community when left unrealized.
Such acts of prohibition leave room to incorporate
holistic thinking about the myriad ways that advanced
decision systems re-shape and bear upon human
societies. Bans and moratoriums hold a space for
reflection on the systemic burdens disguised by
disingenuous rhetoric and incremental reformism. It
provides the proverbial “frog” with the interruption
necessary to recognize that it is in the proverbial “boiling
pot”.
Another benefit of this approach to resisting
automation’s impositions is that it reconfigures the
distribution of labor involved in shaping the roles that
digital decision systems ought to have in society.
Algorithmic silence places the burden of proof on
enthusiasts, rather than on critics, to prove why formal
techniques and technological artifacts should be
welcomed into a social system at all. Revoking
entitlements to public goodwill reveals the actual toll of
integrating such systems into daily life. Enthusiasts
would need to prove ahead of time how their automated
systems function without access to no-pay and low-pay
surrogates to clean up the mess caused by piloting poor
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tech craftsmanship on the public. This tempts reflection
on automation’s full bill (and distribution) of costs, the
nature of which transcend financial levees.
A third additional benefit to the normalization of
prohibitions as a response to the excesses of an
automated society is that this path would limit
corporations’ access to public coffers. By this route,
universities and colleges would be spared reduction to
the role of algorithmic custodians; history departments
would need to be shuttered so that a new generation of
scholars can find and resolve software errors on behalf
of Facebook. Algorithmic silence asserts that the
significant and underappreciated costs of experimenting
with automation in the wild are paid for by the scientist
and their patrons, rather than by the communities those
groups treat as laboratories. Those who champion the
horizon politics of automation, meaning the notion that
decency will come “eventually” and that the status quo
must remain until then, are handed responsibility for
these “acceptable” burdens instead.
The motive power of a well-timed silence rings loudly.
Rest, some forget, is its own vehicle. The ambience it
creates is inhabitable and thus sacred. By this view,
algorithmic silence is another safe road to progress.
Sahlins—aware that declines in leisure time have been
naturalized over centuries and can thus be
denaturalized—famously memorializes hunter gathers
as the original affluent society given that they toiled only
three to five hours a day[118]. Via a far more theory-laden
approach, Mejias introduces the term “paranode” to
characterize the multitudes that lie beyond the network
logics used in contemporary life to model and assimilate
all that is social. A paranode is a place beyond the
conceptual limits of networks[119]; a structural
component that alters network outcomes but from
outside the network’s reach. An act of paranodality is
one of disidentification with the logic of that network.
Consider a broken URL, RFID (radio-frequency
identification) blocker, or pirate radio. Each exists
slightly beyond the validation of the networks designed
to subsume it. By rejecting the hegemony of advanced
decision systems, algorithmic silence fosters
paranodality.
This account of paranodality from Mejias implies that
those who resist disidentification from a network are
more radical than those who cause it. By my account,
those who reject algorithmic silence are tantamount to
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those who reject silence in music. This willingness to
create cacophony is deeply political, since it is often not
those enthusiasts who suffer its hazards. In response,
these parties claim that acts of prohibition are antithetical
to progress. This shaky platform would seek to
undermine that silence is in fact co-constitutive of
harmony; the two cannot exist apart. Writes
musicologist Zofia Lissa, “In its symbiosis with sonority,
silence is one of the structural elements of the sound
fabric, though in itself silence is the very negation of a
sound fabric.”[120] Mejias, too, positions paranodality as
intrinsic to a networks’ structure. An attack on
disidentification is thus an attack on the structure of the
network.
At root, musical notation and network structures can
be understood as metaphors for epistemic sovereignty in
the face of technoscientific hegemony. Each makes a
virtue of noncompliance. Algorithmic silence, likewise,
provides an ambience that is, at first, epistemically
nonhierarchical. What comes from this state, however,
is unpromised. At best, respite from the perils of
ubiquitous AI could provide a window into a way of
knowing that colonialism has forcefully displaced; an
occasion, per Nelson, to witness that “the human is not
a problem to move beyond”[121]. Silence for the sake of
silence constrains positivist technoscience by asserting
arbitrary limits to its valorization of hyper
rationalization and administration. It is an invitation to
technocrats to stand outside of that rationalist bubble; to
grieve, instead, the presumptuous fictions of progress
and futurity. A chorus of algorithmic silences, the author
wagers, could help to break the spell of AI by building
harmony between its countless alternatives. Proponents
of such techniques would arrive, instead, into the present,
occupied as it is by the durability of imperialism[122] and
the permanence of pollution[123]. Here, a different set of
experts call the tune.
The growing ubiquity of advanced low-cost
automation techniques has made strange bedfellows of
those who seek the dangers of unrestrained automation.
Military researchers, both in the US and India, have
recently framed contemporary information flows as a
growing impediment to their ideological aims rather than
a cherished resource[124, 125]. “The desire to have
maximum inputs for decision making is a tempting
proposition but will have to be tempered with the
necessity of giving a decision in time. As time pressures
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become more acute, we may well end up with
‘information decoherence’.”[126] This is a remarkable
outcome given that the US military played a definitive
role in pioneering modern information management
techniques via the development of systems analysis,
operations research, game theory, and digital computing
and digital networking generally[127, 128]. For military
researchers to insinuate the need to de-escalate
information management is telling of the hazardous path
dependencies of unrestrained automation. It speaks to a
carrying capacity, or ceiling, after which even hardline
proponents see diminishing returns from the logics
behind mass automation. Cowan, similarly, debunks the
popular myth that American domestic technologies
saved domestic laborers time through automation. In fact,
Cowan shows, such tools introduced more work for
these laborers by upsetting the equitable models of labor
distribution assumed in prior centuries[93].
In raising these critiques, and the unique possibilities
afforded by the thoughtful use of prohibition amidst the
rapid development of low-cost automated systems, the
author seeks to emphasize the search for harmony in the
development of digital automation regimes, particularly
in the value-sensitive realm of democratic governance.
It bears mention at this juncture that silence, on its own,
is not harmonious, although the experience of it may be
pleasing at times. Harmony, by definition, requires the
thoughtful combination of positive expressions and their
opposites, rather than simply the preservation of a dead
signal or cacophony. The possibilities for proverbial
harmony, in this regard, are vast[129]. In their 2020 book
Meaningful Inefficiencies, for instance, Gordon and
Mugar argue that public trust in civic organizations
requires that such systems are designed not to be
efficient[130].
In consideration of what precise balance to strike, it is
worth considering that contemporary debates over
acceptable levels of formalization and algorithmic
management in a given context mirror a longstanding
dilemma in American political theory about the
appropriate balance between democratic representation
and the agents who administer it. Herein lies a thorny
trade-off: administrative decision makers in large-scale
democracies, such as monetary experts, hold both the
specialist knowledge to make an informed judgement
and a capricious discretion over outcomes that no elected
representative could ever hope to oversee. Sheer
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administrative
complexity
stifles
democratic
accountability by furnishing these experts with
determinative rather than consultative capabilities[131].
Since there are too many experts for any elected
representative to ever manage in these large systems, this
group of specialists effectively skirt traditional modes of
civic accountability.
The AI “revolution” teases this dilemma into new
territory. As in industry, political administrators are
easily tempted toward the presumed incentives of
fauxtomation—efficiency, self-regulation, cost savings,
etc.[79] This temptation leads them headlong toward a
murky accounting of the contingent labor required to
accomplish desired outcomes. The introduction of yet
another layer of abstraction into state administration puts
yet more distance between the public and their
representatives[132, 133].⑲ Worse, Kafkaesque modes of
administrative accountability fatigue the public’s
sensitivity to their civic entitlements. “Decision-making
structures become systems of domination”, warn
Downey and Simons about the failings of contemporary
pre-automated democratic procedures, “Nobody
appears to have responsibility for the reproduction of
injustice over time: not elected representatives,
delegated agencies or private corporations”[131]. As in
the American and Indian military contexts referenced
above, complexity has exhausted the system’s potential
for capacity.
The promise (or specter) of automation is that it can
resolve complex administrative tradeoffs in a seemingly
rational fashion. Regrettably, as demonstrated in the
opening to this article, disingenuous rhetoric around the
true capabilities of such techniques distorts a clear
appraisal of their worth. Confusion over this accounting
becomes, in the process, its own powerful form of
deflection. When questioned by the US Congress and
Senate about Facebook’s content moderation
architecture in 2018, for instance, Mark Zuckerberg
made frequent appeals to the efficacy of “artificial
intelligence” to solve known problems[134], despite the
⑲ Lanius introduces how statistical technologies distort expectations
about evidence amongst black and white communities. Hill shows how
access to evidence from sophisticated analytical tools privileges those in
the criminal justice system but penalizes marginalized individuals.
Literature on the digital divide substantiates other disparities caused by
the politics of digitization, such as the fact that the majority of content on
the internet is in English, which alienates people who speak other
languages, and that this content is most often developed for haptic
interfaces on computers and smartphones, which alienates people with
disabilities.
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efficacy of such methods remaining untested. From this
perspective, Zuckerberg’s call for patience is in fact a
call for the public to subsidize the status quo; to absorb
the costs of his failure indefinitely in the hopes of an
imminent technological solution—a simple expression
of horizon politics in action. In the process, technical and
intellectual debts continue to accrue, along with the
social costs of abuse, harassment, and misinformation
that traffic on his channels.
While Zuckerberg and Facebook can, for the moment,
sustain this violent charade, it is less clear that a genuine
large-scale democracy can do so as well. Consider the
right to a public defender. This right is made trivial if that
defender is too overburdened to adequately fulfil the
duty, as is now the case in areas in the United States[135].
In this instance, a failure in due process negates the
possibility to assert hard-won democratic principles;
justice delayed is justice denied. While new technologies
are held up as solutions as such problems, their total
compounded administrative costs remain unclear at best,
as the author has argued. At worst, sophisticated digital
architecture is a known hazard to accountability. In an
indicative case-study, Dick and Volmar capture what is
called “dependency hell” in the use of Microsoft’s
infrastructure[97]. In this hell, individual components
function precisely as intended but systemic failure
results, nonetheless. “Who ultimately ‘owns’ a failure in
a system like this?” they ask, “More importantly, who
fixes it?”[97]
Algorithmic silence tempts these obscure politics into
the light. The term connects acts of restraint that might
otherwise be read as dissimilar. If ubiquitous automation
is liable for its burdens and not just it promises, then bans
on facial recognition technologies can be understood as
of a kind with, say, the EU’s Working Time Directive
(2003/88/EC) and Right to Disconnect, which set out
minimum requirements for rest in relation to telework.
Each intervention imposes regulatory limits on the
prospect of algorithmic optimization. Whether or not the
human workplace or the human face is pliable to such
techniques is made moot. Regulators, following public
pressure, preserve the relatively intimate (if imperfect)
modes of accountability permitted by human-to-human
scale interaction.
The need to protect time and space from the AI
Revolution echoes in literature on AI and medicine.
Topol speculates that the core benefit of advanced
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decision systems will be time savings gained by experts
moving away from automation[136]. US doctors currently
face a degenerative cycle; more than 50 percent suffer
burnout and 25 percent suffer depression—pressures
that beget additional medical errors and strain, which
exacerbate suffering and can lead to suicide[136]. Topol
positions protections on time as a promising line of
resolution to this feedback loop, not just for clinician’s
work/life balance, but also for patient outcomes. A study
of 60000 caregiver visits identified the provision of
additional patient-to-expert time as the most reliable
path to decreasing hospital readmissions, as other studies
support[136].⑳
In medicine, human-to-human accountability regimes
led to improved outcomes. Summarizing one of several
such studies, Topol writes, “Taking the computer out of
the exam room and supporting doctors with human
medical assistants led to a striking reduction in physician
burnout, from 53 percent to 13 percent.”[136] This
solution is not new. On the contrary, Topol’s thesis
echoes the sentiment of William Osler, co-founder of
John Hopkins Hospital, who wrote in 1895, “A sick man
cannot be satisfactorily examined in less than half an
hour.”[136] Indra Joshi, Digital Health and AI Clinical
Lead for NHS England, agrees. Joshi describes the
experience of waiting in the journey for treatment—for
results, a specialist, or a bed—not as a process, but as a
state of being, “A feeling of being neither here nor
there”[137]. This is the same torturous state of being that
Zuckerberg, Facebook, and other influential proponents
of ubiquitous digital automation advocate for and
enforce through the tact they take to technological
development[138]. Just hold on, the story goes, we are
almost there.
To interrupt this rhetoric, critics must adequately
diagnose its charm. Crucially, Zuckerberg and peers
assume no finite constraints on time. This is their faux
reality. Such appeals benefit from at least three levels of
illocution[139] (Garvey characterizes the history of AI as
a string of illocutionary acts or promises). Within AI, as
the author has introduced, technical terms like “predict”
describe a desired end state, not a procedure in time. The
term “artificial intelligence” is an exemplar of this trend;
a vague yet seemingly prophetic sign of a movement yet
to come. Reckless critique overlooks this folly. It accepts
⑳ Giving a patient an additional minute with an expert reduced their
probability of being readmitted by 18%, or 13% in the case of nurses. A
separate study found that additional time with experts reduced
hospitalizations by twenty percent.
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AI rhetoric without scrutiny and diverts attention from
wishful mnemonics to “wishful worries”, Brock’s term
for “problems that it would be nice to have, in contrast
to the actual agonies of the present”[140]. Meanwhile, a
fleet of human contributions, both paid and unpaid,
perform, unknowingly and knowingly, a broad array of
discreet tasks that, if overlooked as systemic and
connected, might lend AI an air of legitimacy and
imminence. Like the Church-Turing Thesis, AI provides
a tantalizing and multifaceted escape from the existence
of time and space, but only for a privileged few.
To interrupt this wishful cycle, critics must situate AI
within the post digital era, meaning the period in which,
“The revolutionary phase of the information age has
surely passed”[141]. Cut off from the ability to escape
time or make vague appeals to imminent transformation,
AI advocates would be pressed to justify their
interventions on alternative grounds. One option the
author has championed here is to audit the labor required
to develop, deploy, maintain, critique, and use such tools.
If this was a norm, a clearer picture of AI’s proffered
impact on labor could begin to emerge. More likely,
expert-led calls for algorithmic accountability would be
met with a charge akin to “Luddite!”. The author, for one,
fears that the history of Luddism is too disanalogous to
today to accommodate the paradoxes of contemporary
automation, replete as it is with the compounding
intersectional realities of gender, race, class, coloniality,
and globalization[21, 142]. Digital tools embody
opportunities and risk across many layers
simultaneously; their treatment deserves more nuance.
Enter algorithmic silence. If unburdened by the
accumulated labor required to perform the AI
Revolution ad infinitum, citizens would gain the
incremental derivative economic or administrative relief
needed to decide on a civic future for themselves. Their
reliance on technocrats posturing as AI ethicists would
be diminished in proportion to the nonproliferation of
faux automation systems, since—in principle—the civic
space in which they operate would be relatively less
influenced by unrestricted impositions on their finite
time. Algorithmic silence provides a content agnostic
framework for solidarity across settings, be it restraint
for workers, consumers, parents, prisoners, women,
youth, etc. The prospect of solidarity across these
contexts is, in principle, broad enough to answer
orthogonal pressures from data science. Ribes, for
example, shows how the term “domain” presupposes a
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role for computing in areas of life not yet conscripted into
such methods[143–145]. For solidarity to emerge across
countercultures, interventions must evidence a larger
movement, whatever it may be called. Algorithmic
silence is a step toward that end.
As critics mobilize against automation’s harms, they
must confront the possibility of achieving a Pyrrhic
victory. Clearly articulated ethical principles would
indeed be a positive result, but their enshrinement into
law remains only half the battle (see also Ref. [146], this
issue). Commitments to due process must also be
considered, articulated, enacted, and enforced, or
hard-won principles will be a farce, as is witnessed with
overworked public defenders and caregivers. The
politics of procedure and promise of automation merit
deep contemplation in a moment when indigenous
leaders and scholars in particular reaffirm ancient
notions of accountability to place, planet, and people that
stand to exceed the shortcomings of liberal democratic
imaginaries[147–149]. Transformation is possible, but
likely not via appeasement. By continuing to normalize
the presumption that automation can be refined and
improved—that satisfactory tech ethics can be
articulated—those in the realm of automation
development and critique point to a loadstar that either
misguides them, or makes real a system of politics that,
in fact, they endorse but have not yet been held
accountable for.

6

Conclusion

Arthur C. Clarke’s popular Third Law About the Future
boasts, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from magic.”[150] This literary “law” is
often cited in salesmanship that surrounds the AI
Revolution. It is used to paint a boundary between those
who create technology and those who merely witness it.
In this article, the author has questioned that boundary
by exploring the ways in which groups who experience
the “magic” of digital automation is often made into
co-managers of that performance via ghost work,
technical debt, intellectual debt, the labor of critique,
participatory labor, or some combination therein. The
author questions how the experience of advanced
technologies changes as onlookers participate in an
increasing number of performances simultaneously, day
after day, week after week, without structured relief to
their expected vigilance. Clarke’s “law” claims to speak
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to the performative aspects of a new technology. Yet,
tellingly, it speaks not at all to experience of those
performers whose labor substantiates the act.
Given the need for public awareness around the
structural impositions caused by an automated society,
as well as the risk of paternalism that accompanies
unchecked faith in a technocratic expert-led resistance,
it is worthwhile to question which vocabularies
adequately capture the character of the phenomenon the
author has engaged herein. Algorithmic silence resists
the tradition of highly formalized and positivist
articulations of social dynamics that prefigure and
inform contemporary forms of digital automation. The
concept, instead, reifies the virtues of deliberate relief
from these types of knowing. At best, it affords
collective freedoms from the onslaught of formalisms
and encoded behaviors that are sure to accompany the
prolific use of low-cost automation. Algorithmic silence
treats rest as its own dignified vehicle to progress—one
that could surface lines of solidarity across otherwise
divisive relationships changed by a rising torrent of
discrete obligations. With each passing day, the global
community awakens to the reality that, as Dick and
Volmar suggest, we are all system administers now (or
will be, eventually). Servicing the need for spaces
untouched by algorithmic enclosure would allow civic
communities the distance to reflect on and shape this
unfolding phenomenon for themselves—or at least see
that it is occurring.
Acts of wholesale prohibition such as that which the
author distills as algorithmic silence tempt reflection on
the ethos of entitlement that sustains contemporary
myths about digital automation and a looming AI
Revolution. If judged in relation to time and space, as
opposed to the timelessness of an endless horizons, AI
fits more neatly into the post-digital era in which no
significant change to the existing social order is to be
expected. At a superficial level, this reappraisal of
rhetoric could help to steer AI development in line with
existing traditions of de-escalation, such as
decomputerization and degrowth, although the nuances
of this proposal merit closer consideration (since
algorithmic silence could also be abused). Those who
address the environmental toll of machine learning
systems, however, have made similar calls for
decomputerization[151, 152]. Such acts of relief color the
edges of what could become a powerful deindustrial
revolution: a transformation equal in magnitude to the

351

fabled AI Revolution but led, instead, by communities
rather than corporate needs.
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